Introduction From Admiral Owen's "System of Systems" to JCS's "Concept for Future Joint Operations"{CFJO) "dominant battle space knowledge" or "information superiority" has become prerequisite for future joint operations. Information superiority enables dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection. The presumption that future U.S. forces will enjoy information superiority to achieve full spectrum dominance is the basis for Joint Vision 2010 . Far from being just a fashionable term, the postulate of future information superiority could drive important acquisition, doctrine, training, strategic, operational and tactical decisions. With so much riding on a single assumption where is the corresponding justification --"Where's the Beef?!"
The latest and most specific definition of JCS's "conceptual framework for America's armed forces" , CFJO, offers little support to its information superiority hypothesis. While potential threats are mentioned, none are said to be able to negate the vision. CFJO acknowledges a contest for information superiority but concludes:
"Although we will continue to achieve new levels of technological capability, [Joint Vision 2010's] prediction that while 'the friction and the fog of war can never be eliminated, new technology promises to mitigate their impact' will remain true."
In other words, threats to technology based information superiority will be mitigated by superior technology. Far from defending the information superiority postulate -CFJO evades the issue behind a cloak of technical hubris. Absent official substantive support for the information superiority assumption how valid is Joint Vision 20101 Operational Information Duality A military commander is principally concerned with two types of information in the pursuit of dynamic battlespace awareness-- (1) friendly force information, and (2) enemy force information.
Understanding the differences between these two categories of operational information is critical to appreciating the extent of Joint Vision 2010's optimistic information superiority supposition.
Own force information is gained through collaboration.
Dispersed friendly units share state and control data through a complex "network of networks." Because own force information is collaborative, increased technology and resources can directly improve own force situational awareness. Though friendly forces can still contribute to the "fog of war", CFJO's contention that technology improvements will improve a commander's view of the battlespace should at least hold true for friendly forces.
Conversely, information about the enemy involves competition.
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets compete against enemy information security and deception measures for access to relevant data. For a commander to enjoy enemy situation awareness two conditions must be satisfied:
1) Friendly forces must be able to collect and exploit relevant information.
2) The enemy must be unable or unwilling to either protect his relevant information, or deceive friendly forces.
In the real world, ISR involves a never ending battle between an enemy trying to deny critical information and friendly forces attempting to Imagery support at the operational and strategic level faces daunting challenges. The explosion of sophisticated commercial satellite imagery systems will soon give everyone, including potential enemies, access to cheap high resolution imagery products. Future foes will know the strengths and weaknesses of overhead imagery. They will appreciate the need for, and could effectively develop and test, multispectral concealment and deception measures.
As "weapons of precise destruction" (WPD) (i.e. smart weapons)
proliferate along with weapons of mass destruction, the strategic and operational imagery problem escalates. Enemy military centers of gravity in the information age will shrink in footprint, and grow in number by using distributed small mobile assets rather than a few fixed large targets, while the area to move and hide such entities will grow.
The modern enemy will enjoy many home field advantages plus the added benefits of smaller, more lethal tools. Conversely it is harder to hide major U.S. force projection assets in a foreign region.
The trend in imaging satellite vulnerability is also troubling.
Today imagery satellites are easily identified and tracked by space buffs and amateur astronomers with personal equipment. Space launches are openly announced. Their ephemeris data are openly shared on the 13 INTERNET for all to see.
By gathering and exploiting this information, hostile countries can minimize imaging satellite exposure.
Adversaries may simply limit sensitive activity during imaging satellite passes. In addition to passive cover and deception measures many hostile forces will likely be able to engage imaging satellites with active countermeasures. Nowhere else has information technology growth improved a potential adversary's ability to conceal relevant information and deceive intelligence efforts. This is because the information revolution significantly improves the prospects for information security.
"Protection and security measures are broader than the U.S. concepts of operations security (OPSEC) and force protection. The [opposition force] considers information a critical resource and takes appropriate protective measures such as censoring, camouflage, counter-reconnaissance, and encryption."
The same technology that enables better C4 can also limit ISR.
As digital communications costs continue to drop, more countries are replacing old vulnerable analog systems with more sophisticated low probability of intercept (LPI) digital products. "The ability to filter through the huge volumes of data and to extract the information from the layers of formatting, multiplexing, compression, and transmission protocols applied to each message is the biggest challenge of the future. Increasing the amounts and sophistication of encryption add another layer of complexity."
As voice and data become digital they become easy to encrypt. would have taken 8.6 trillion times the age of the universe."
Strong data and voice encryption software, such as "PGP" (Pretty Good Privacy) and "PGP fone", is easy to use and available free on the world wide web.
Even if the U.S. eventually breaks strong encryption, computer technology has now made totally secure communications practical. "Onetime pad" encryption has and always will be impossible to break, but until the advent of computers, it was difficult to do. Today CD-ROM technology coupled with better random number generators, has made large one-time key pads easy to create, duplicate, and employ.
Besides encryption, critical information now can be readily hidden within "noise." Information can be cloaked in the ones and zeroes that define a picture, or buried within data frames used to send voice or data through a network.
HUMINT
Ironically, as information technologies advance, HUMINT requirements remain high. The "Strategic Intelligence Reviews" of 1994 rated HUMINT as the most important source, "judged to make a 'critical' yourself, your chances of winning and losing are equal."
Proponents of the new vision fail to see the growing potential of information denial to counter full spectrum dominance. They count on information asymmetries to provide the leverage for future force projection. Unfortunately equal or superior C4 is not enough. Without sufficient ISR information, the JFC has only half the picture.
Advanced ISR resources may not be enough if they are denied access to relevant information. Though some trends could be reversed to improve U.S. ISR capabilities, that probably won't be enough to overcome increasingly probable enemy countermeasures.
Given a preponderance of the evidence for a future that favors relevant information security we should question the very premise of information superiority in 2010. Before committing to the quest for full spectrum dominance we must consider the effect of information denial on forces and doctrine shaped by Joint Vision 2010.
